Did the Fed Fail as a Financial Supervisor?

No need to remind dear reader that the Fed is certainly under attack from all sides these days. Ben Bernanke recently gave testimony in the House Financial Services committee, explaining how the Fed had no idea about what was going on at Lehman’s; see Fed Had Limited Oversight on Lehman.

What is going on here? Is the Fed really this clueless? Can we really trust the Fed in its proposed supervisory role, given its pathetic record in this regard?

Well, I’m not sure. But let me share with you a few things that I do know (or think I know).


[1] The U.S. has a primary regulator system for the nation’s 8000+ commercial banks and thrifts; the primary regulator has the key authority for the regulation of the bank in question.
[2] Before the crisis (as of Jan 2007), the Fed had primary regulator responsibility for about 12% of all banks (14% by assets).

In other words: more than 85% of banks and bank assets had non-Fed primary regulators.


[1] Banks are only one part of the financial landscape. As the crisis began, 20 firms accounted for about 80% of S&P financial sector assets in the U.S.
[2] About 1/3 of this total was in banks; about 2/3 of this total was in non-bank financial firms, including government-sponsored-agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), investment banks, insurance companies, and thrifts.
[3] Non-bank financial firms turned out to the most troubled entities in the crisis.

The Fed had no supervisory authority over these entities, including

  • Investment banks, like Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns
  • Insurance companies, like Prudential and AIG
  • Financial hybrids, like GE Capital and GMAC

And so, whether by accident or design, the Fed in fact had authority over only a very small segment of the financial market. Nevertheless, when the crisis hit, the Fed was widely expected to act quickly in its role as lender-of-last-resort. Many of the Fed’s decisions, subject to great criticism today, involved “bailing out” non-bank firms like Bear Stearns and AIG — firms for which the Fed had no supervisory authority.


Imagine putting yourself in this situation. You are legally prohibited from supervising the vast majority of financial sector actors. You are not privy to any of their financial information. But when a crisis hits a group of these firms, you are asked to supply emergency loans…today…not next week, or one month from now. You are told, and you may even suspect it a possibility, that the entire financial system may collapse if you do not provide this emergency lending. So, what do you do?

Personally, I think I would not have done it (though this is easy to say from my office chair). But the Fed did it. Can you really blame them? And the lending had to be extended to agencies not even under the Fed’s supervision. Are we to be surprised if “mistakes” were made? Who is to blame for all this? The Fed?

Make no mistake. The Fed, like any institution, should be subject to criticism and review. At the same time, any such criticism should be fair and balanced (especially if one expects enlightened legislation to emerge from the impending Dodd Bill).

About David Andolfatto 91 Articles

Affiliation: Simon Fraser University and St. Louis Fed

David Andolfatto is a Vice President in the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. He is also a professor of economics at Simon Fraser University.

Professor Andolfatto earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Western Ontario in 1994, M.A. and B.B.A. from Simon Fraser University. He was associate professor at the University of Waterloo before moving to Simon Fraser University in 2000.

His current research is focused on reconciling theories of money and banking. His past research has examined questions relating to the business cycle, contract design, bank-runs, unemployment insurance, monetary policy regimes, endogenous debt constraints, and technology diffusion.

Visit: MacroMania, David Andolfatto's Page

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.